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The Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment includes the often ignored
Public Use Provision.  This paper looks at
the Court’s broad interpretation of this
provision and its deference to redevelop-
ment agencies.  Currently, the Court uses
two tests - “purely private” and blight
removal - to determine if the government
action has violated the public use provi-
sion.  In a recent California case, 99 Cents
Only Store v. Lancaster Redevelopment Agency1,
the district judge applied both of these
tests and determined that the
Redevelopment Agency had overstepped
its authority.  This paper discusses the
role the courts should play in redevelop-
ment in light of the framers’ intent and
precedent in the area of substantive eco-
nomic due process.  This paper also
addresses the impact of 99 Cents on tak-
ings law and the need for a clear test to
determine what is a legitimate taking for
public use.
Taking for Any Purpose?
By Camarin Madigan*
* Camarin Madigan receieved her J.D. from UC
Hastings in May of 2003.  She would like to thank
Professor Brian Gray and Gideon Kanner for their
help in researching this article as well as the edi-
torial staff of this journal for assisting in preparing
this article for publication.
1.  237 F. Supp.2d 1123 (C.D. Cal. 2001); dis-
missed and remanded 60 Fed.Appx. 123, 2003 WL
932421 (9th Cir. 2003)(not selected for publica-
tion).  The appellate court affirmed the district
court’s conclusion that the controversy was not
moot at the time the district court granted the
injunction.  This procedural setting does not affect
the substantive law discussed herein.
II.   History of the Takings Clause: 
How Far is Too Far?
Eminent domain is the power of the
sovereign to acquire private property for
public use.2 The sovereign’s power of
eminent domain existed at common law.3
This sovereign power to take property was
limited4 by the Fifth Amendment to the
United States Constitution: “nor shall pri-
vate property be taken for pubic use, with-
out just compensation.”5 The Fifth
Amendment places two conditions on the
government’s power to take property: the
taking must be for a public use and the
landowner must receive just compensa-
tion.  The United States Supreme Court
began to interpret these limitations near-
ly a century after the drafting of the Fifth
Amendment.6 The first view of eminent
domain was rather narrow: “a right
belonging to a sovereignty to take private
property for its own uses, and not for
those of another.”7
A  broader view is that “public use”
provides the public with some benefit.8
As the American economy developed in
the twentieth century, the Supreme Court
moved toward this more broad view of the
Public Use provision.9 The Court began to
reason that the Public Use provision was
satisfied as long as the taking contributed
to the economic growth of the communi-
ty.  In a landmark redevelopment case of
1954, the Court acknowledged the police
power of redevelopment agencies to take
private property.10 Thus, the police power
components of “public safety, health, and
morality,” fulfilled the requirements of the
Public Use provision.11 In this case, the
Court determined the taking of land for a
private developer contributed to econom-
ic growth, enhanced public health, safety,
morals and welfare, and was thus deter-
mined to be a legitimate taking under the
Fifth Amendment12 because an area was
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2.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (7th ed. 1999).
3.  The inherent power of the sovereign to exer-
cise eminent domain was “well known when the
Constitution was adopted.”  Kohl v. U.S., 91 U.S.
367, 372 (1876).  Term “eminent domain” is traced
back to legal writings of Grotius in 1685.  See Jack J.
Kitchin, What Use Is a Public Use in Eminent Domain?, 4
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 316 n. 1 (1957) (citing Groff v. Bird-
in-Hand Turnpike Co., 18 A. 431 (Pa. 1889).
4.  At common law, the power of eminent
domain could take any form that the government
desired.  Thus, the broad scope of common law
eminent domain authority was limited.  1 JOHN J.
DELANEY ET AL., LAND USE PRACTICE AND FORMS:
HANDLING THE LAND USE CASE 21-2 (2d ed. 1999).
5.  U.S. CONST. AMEND V.
6.  Kohl, 91 U.S. at 371 (also extending the lim-
itations of the takings clause to the states through
the Fourteenth Amendment).  In Chicago, Burlington
& Quincy Railroad v. City of Chicago, the Court specif-
ically held that the Fourteenth Amendment pre-
vented the states from taking property without just
compensation.  166 U.S. 226 (1897).
7.  Id. at 373-74.
8.  Stephen J. Jones, Trumping Eminent Domain
Law: An Argument for Strict Scrutiny Analysis Under the
Public Use Requirement of the Fifth Amendment, 50
SYRACUSE L. REV. 285, 292 (2000)
9.  See e.g., Hawaii Housing Authority v.
Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984); see also Berman v.
Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954); see also Old Dominion
Land Co. v. U.S., 269 U.S. 55 (1925).
10.  Berman, 348 U.S. at 28.
11.  Id.
12.  Id. at 29.
13.  Physical and economic conditions that
cause blight.  Cal. Health & Safety Code § 33031
(West 2002).  (Buildings in which it is unsafe or
unhealthy for persons to live or work.  Factors that
prevent or substantially hinder the economically
viable use or capacity of buildings or lots.
Depreciated or stagnant property values or
impaired investments, including those properties
containing hazardous wastes.  Abnormally high
business vacancies, abnormally low lease rates,
high turnover rates, abandoned buildings, or
excessive vacant lots within an area developed for
urban use and served by utilities.)
Thirty years later, the Supreme Court
reaffirmed the import of the Public Use
provision and stated “purely private takings
will not withstand the scrutiny of the public
use requirement.”14 However, in the same
case, the Court also stated that if the pur-
pose of the taking was rationally related to
a conceivable public use, it would not vio-
late the Takings Clause.15 In fact, a private
taking may rise to the level of a public affair
given its class or character.16 This shift to a
broader construction of the Public Use pro-
vision maintained the Supreme Court’s def-
erential treatment of public use determina-
tions by the legislature.
The Supreme Court had extended
great deference to the legislative determi-
nation of public use as early as 1896.17 At
that time the Court  held that “when the
legislature has declared the use or pur-
pose to be a public one, its judgment will
be respected by the courts, unless the use
be palpably without reasonable founda-
tion.”18 If a public use proposed by the
legislature is legitimate and lies within an
explicit constitutional power of Congress,
the use satisfies the Public Use provi-
sion.19 Therefore, an implied power to
condemn exists in situations where the
power of eminent domain is necessary or
appropriate to carry out other powers.
This deferential standard extends from
the Court’s belief that the legislature
would not abuse its power because the
just compensation requirement, which
entails full value of the property to be
paid, restricts any condemnation for pub-
lic use.20 However, the Court clearly spec-
ified that if the legislature delegates the
power of eminent domain to a private
entity, the deference would not be as
strong.21
In practice, however, judicial review
has been so deferential that a finding of
pubic use seems inevitable.22 The
Supreme Court has held that public use is
coterminous with the scope of the sover-
eign’s police power and, therefore the
Court defers to a legislative determination
that is rationally related to a conceived pub-
lic purpose.23 The limit of the Court’s def-
erence is that if a showing of a public use
is demonstrably pretextual, no judicial
deference is required.24
The role of the courts in the area of
eminent domain cases is self-defined as
an “extremely narrow one.”25 Having the
courts play such a limited role may be
dangerous because it allows corporations
to collude with the government and con-
demn private property for any public use
that can be rationalized.26 Most econom-
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14.  Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 245.
15.  Id. at 241.
16.  Id. at 244 (citing Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S.
135, 155 (1921)).
17.  U.S. v. Gettysburg Electric Ry. Co., 160 U.S.
668 (1896).
18.  Id. at 680.
19.  Id. at 683.
20.  Id. at 680.
21.  Id.
22.  Peter J. Kulick, Comment, Rolling the Dice:
Determining Public Use in Order to Effectuate a “Public-
Private Taking”- A Proposal to Redefine “Public Use,” 2000
L. REV. MICH. ST. U. DET. C.L. 639, 655  (Author writes
how the broad definition of the public use require-
ment allows an expansive reach of public-private
takings.  citing Poletown Neighborhood Council v.
City of Detroit, 410 Mich. 616, 634 (1981).
23.  Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 241.
24.  Armendariz v. Penman, 75 F.3d 1311, 1321
(1996).
25.  Berman, 348 U.S. at 32.
26.  Joseph J. Lazzarotti, Public Use or Public
Abuse, 68 UMKC L. REV. 49, 51 (1999).
because there is a possible benefit to the
public through general welfare and the leg-
islature has the express power to provide
for the general welfare.27 However, simply
concurring with the legislature’s determi-
nation that the rationally conceived use,
purpose or benefit is good for the public
eliminates the judicial check on legislative
decision making.  An expansive definition
of the Public Use provision and great judi-
cial deference have opened the door for
private transfers of condemned property
and may have eliminated the Fifth
Amendment as a viable safeguard of pri-
vate property rights.28
A.  The Supreme Court Acknowledged
the Power of Redevelopment
Agencies
Modern redevelopment law tests the
extent of legislative power, the expansive
definition of the Public Use provision, and
the deferential role of the courts.  In
Berman v. Parker, the U.S. Supreme Court
was faced with a congressional determi-
nation that with respect to Washington
D.C.’s substandard housing and blighted
areas, redevelopment could not be
attained “by the ordinary operations of
private enterprise alone without public
participation.”29 In 1945, Congress enact-
ed the District of Columbia
Redevelopment Act to eliminate injurious
conditions30 through “all means neces-
sary and appropriate for the purpose.”31
Congress created the D.C. Redevelopment
Land Agency and granted it eminent
domain powers to acquire private proper-
ty in order to prevent, reduce, or eliminate
blighting factors.32
The first redevelopment project
attempted was a low-rent housing district.
The Agency acquired and assembled real
property and was authorized to either
lease or sell some of the property33 to a
redevelopment company or individual
who promised to carry out the redevelop-
ment plan.34 One landowner, who owned
a department store in the districted area,
objected to such appropriation because
his property was not blighted slum hous-
ing.  The land owner argued that “[t]o take
a man’s property for the purpose of rid-
ding the area of slums is one thing; it is
quite another . . . to take a man’s property
merely to develop a better balanced, more
attractive community.”35 The Supreme
Court disagreed.  The Court believed that
the standards stated in the Act were ade-
quate not only for eliminating the
slums,36 but also the blight areas that
tend to produce slums.37
The main guardian of the public wel-
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27.  US CONST. art. I, § 8.
28.  See Jones, supra note 7 at 287.
29.  Berman, 348 U.S. at 29.
30.  These conditions include substandard
housing and blighted areas that are injurious to the
public health, safety, morals, and welfare.  Id. at 28.
31.  Id.
32.  Id. at 29.
33.  The Agency was also authorized to trans-
fer the land to public agencies for public purposes,
including streets, utilities, recreational facilities
and schools.  Id at 30.
34.  Id.
35.  Id. at 31.
36.  The district court limited the redevelop-
ment plan to this narrow definition: only existing
slums.  The Supreme Court extended the interpre-
tation of the standards to include future slum
areas.  Id. at 35.
37.  Id.
38.  See Hirsh, 256 U.S. at 155.
public welfare is broad and inclusive.39
The legislature has the authority to deter-
mine the values and needs of community
to support the public welfare.40 Once the
authority of Congress is defined to cover
the public welfare, the right to exercise
eminent domain as a means to the end is
evident.41 To achieve this end, the author-
ized agencies may use eminent domain to
acquire property in all blighted parts of
the community instead of on a limited
“structure-by-structure basis.”42 The spe-
cific attack on the problem is left to the
discretion of the legislative branch once
the legislature determines the broad pub-
lic purpose and the expanse of public wel-
fare covered by the Agency.43
In Berman, the Supreme Court clearly
defined the extent of this discretion by
stating that its role in determining a pub-
lic use was extremely narrow.44 In fact,
once Congress has determined the vari-
ables necessary to maintain the public
welfare, the Court holds it is not in a posi-
tion to “reappraise” these determina-
tions.45 When a public purpose has been
identified, the means by which the legisla-
ture carries out its plan - the amount and
character of land to be taken - fall within
the legislature’s discretion.46
The Court’s broad interpretation of
the police power of the redevelopment
agency in Berman bestowed a certain
amount of authority on redevelopment
agencies and local governments across
the country.  After Berman, two broad rules
existed: the Public Use provision could be
fulfilled by economic revitalization and the
courts would give great deference to the
legislative determination of public use.47
Since public welfare and removal of blight
legitimately fulfilled the “Public Use” pro-
vision, redevelopment agencies had the
authority to condemn property on little
more than a study and findings of blight.
B.  Taking the “Use” out of the 
“Public Use” Provision
Thirty years later, the Supreme Court
reaffirmed a broad reading of the Public
Use provision.48 In Midkiff, the U.S.
Supreme Court relied on Berman to
reverse a Ninth Circuit opinion that the
Hawaii Land Reform Act of 196749 did not
pass the “requisite judicial scrutiny of the
Public Use Clause.”50 The Ninth Circuit
narrowly interpreted Berman to hold that
the government is required to “possess”
and use the property during the taking.51
However, such a literal reading of the tak-
ings clause was rejected by Rindge Co. v. Los
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39.  See Day-Brite Lightning, Inc. v. Missouri,
342 U.S. 421, 424 (1952).
40.  The Court held that “when the legislature has
spoken the public interest has been declared in terms
well-nigh conclusive.”  Berman, 348 U.S. at 32.
41.  See Gettysburg Electric Ry. Co., 160 U.S. at
679; see also Luxton v. N. River Bridge Co., 153 U.S.
525, 529-30 (1894).
42.  Berman, 348 U.S. at 34.
43.  See Shoemaker v. U.S., 147 U.S. 282, 298 (1893).
44.  Berman, 348 U.S. at 32.
45.  Id. at 33.
46.  Id. at 35-36 (citing Shoemaker, 147 U.S. at
298).
47.  Id. at 32, 34.
48.  Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 229.
49.  Land Reform Act of 1967, Haw. Rev. Stat.
§§ 516-1(2), (11), 516-22 (1977).
50.  Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 235.
51.  702 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1983).
52.  262 U.S. 700, 707 (1923) (“[I]t is not essential
that the entire community, nor even any considerable
portion . . . directly enjoy or participate in any improve-
ment in order [for it] to constitute a public use.”).
held that a more rigorous judicial scrutiny
of the state’s legislative determinations
was necessary.53 The Supreme Court dis-
agreed and stated that requiring this
stricter standard would be ironic because
the Public Use provision is incorporated
through the Fourteenth Amendment,
whereas the legislature is mandated by
the Fifth Amendment.54
Instead, the Supreme Court read
Berman to require both a legitimate leg-
islative police power and judicial defer-
ence: “when the legislature has spoken,
the public interest has been declared in
terms well-nigh conclusive.”55 In Midkiff,
the Hawaiian legislature claimed public
welfare alone, with no finding of blight, as
its authority to condemn the property
specified in the Land Reform Act.56 The
Hawaiian legislature passed the Act to
condemn privately owned residential
tracts and then to transfer the condemned
property to existing lessees to redress
problems caused by concentrated land
ownership.57 The purpose was to redis-
tribute the land to guard against inflating
land prices and to protect public tranquil-
ity and welfare.58
To determine whether Hawaii con-
demned the property for a “public use” the
Court examined the scope of the state’s
police power and concluded that the leg-
islature is “the main guardian of the pub-
lic needs.”59 The Court held that the
Public Use requirement is “coterminous60
with the scope of the sovereign’s police
power.”61 Then, the Court deferred to the
legislature’s police power.  Such deference
is required “until it is shown to involve an
impossibility.”62 Once the legislature has
determined that the project has a legiti-
mate public purpose, the legislature has
the ability to choose the means with
which to accomplish the project.63
Judicial restraint requires the Courts to be
deferential to the legislatures in deter-
mining governmental function.64 While
the scope of judicial scrutiny is narrow,
“there is, of course, a role for the courts to
play in reviewing a legislature’s judgment
of what constitutes a public use.”65 No
judicial deference is required, for
instance, where the ostensible public use
is demonstrably pretextual.66
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53.  Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 243.
54.  Id. at 244, n. 7.
55.  Id. at 239.
56.  Id. at 236-37.
57.  In fact, no oligopoly existed.  The condemned
land was part of a moral trust formed by the last
Hawaiian royalty.  Income from the trust supported
Kamahamaha schools.  The long-term leaseholds were
functioning for the public good.  Politician John Connor
pushed the Act through the Hawaiian legislature for his
own benefit.  The results were devastating to the lessees.
When the land became freehold, Japanese businessmen,
who do not tend to deal with leaseholds, bought all the
houses, reducing the already limited supply.  The Kahala
refugees entered a seller’s market that was marked by
inflated prices.  Although the Court held that there was
adequate police power to support a public use, the real-
ity is that the public was heavily burdened by the ruling.
58.  Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 234.
59.  Id. at 239.
60.  This determination is problematic
because the police power usually divides non-
compensable regulation and a compensable tak-
ing of property.  See Jones supra note 8 at 296.
61.  Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 240.
62.  Id.at 240 (citing Old Dominion, 269 U.S.at 66).
63.  Id.
64.  Berman, 348 U.S. at 36; see also TVA v.
Welch, 327, U.S. 546, 552 (1946); see also Gettysburg
Electric, 160 U.S. at 680.
65.  Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 240.
66.  See Armendariz, 75 F.3d at 1321 (holding
that a forced sale of private property for purpose of
allowing private developer to acquire it at a
reduced price would not be for “public use”).
of eminent domain is rationally related67
to the public purpose of reducing the
land oligopoly that inhibits the econom-
ic market for land.68 Because regulating
oligopolies is a comprehensive and
rational approach to maintaining general
welfare, the Court held that the legisla-
ture could have rationally believed that
the Act promoted its objectives.69
Whether the Act was successful in
achieving these goals is irrelevant, the
legislature merely had to rationally
believe the Act will meet these goals.70
The purpose of the taking, not the
process, must meet the requirements of
the Public Use provision.71 The Court
held that the purpose of the Act, eliminat-
ing oligopolies, was a legitimate public
purpose, fell within the legislature’s
police power, and benefited the general
welfare.72 Only a “purely private” taking
would not satisfy the requirements of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.73
C.  “Purely Private” and Removing
Blight, the Two Tests of the 
Public Use Provision
Today, the Takings Clause is still
interpreted broadly.  To meet the Public
Use provision, a legislature need only
show that the purpose behind the project
falls under its legitimate police power.74
A connection to public health, safety,
morals, or welfare allows a legislature to
condemn private property in order to carry
out a plan.75 The most liberal test is the
“not purely private” justification of
Midkiff.76 Any rational suggestion of gen-
eral welfare will do.77
Most redevelopment programs rely
on blight to establish the public welfare,
public use requirement.  By citing blight,
redevelopers lock in on the local govern-
ment’s unquestioned authority to safe-
guard “health and safety.”78 In California,
redevelopers rely on this rationale. The
goal of California Community
Redevelopment Law is to give a redevel-
opment agency the power to remove
existing blight.”79 Avoiding “future blight”
is speculative and, therefore, the courts
have held that it is not a means to satisfy
the “Public Use” provision.80 Because a
legislature or redevelopment agency must
determine existing blight, an area’s exist-
ing use, not a potential one, is the basis
for public use.”81
However, this extreme reliance on
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67.  Berman, 348 U.S. at 32; see also Rindge Co.
v. Los Angeles, 262 U.S. 700 (1923).
68.  Regulating an oligopoly and the evils
associated with it is a classic example of a State’s
police powers.  Id. at 242 (citing Exxon Corp. v.
Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117 (1978)).
69.  Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 242 (quotingWestern &
Southern Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization,
451 U.S. 648, 671-72 (1981)).
70.  Id. at 242.
71.  Id. at 240.
72.  Id. at 245.
73.  Id.
74.  Id. at 240.
75.  Berman, 348 U.S. at 28.
76.  Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 245.
77.  Id. at 242.
78.  George Lefcoe, Finding the Blight That’s Right
for California Redevelopment Law, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 991,
992 (2001).
79.  Beach-Courchesne v. City of Diamond Bar,
95 Cal Rptr. 2d 265, 279 (Cal. Ct. App., 2000); see also
Friends of Mammoth v. Town of Mammoth Lakes
Redev. Agency, 98 Cal. Rptr. 2d 334, 362 (Cal. Ct.
App., 2000).
80.  Id.
81.  Mammoth, 98 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 362.
United States Supreme Court precedent.82
In Berman¸ the Court upheld a redevelop-
ment plan that invoked eminent domain
power for the “prevention, reduction, or
elimination of blighting factors or causes
of blight.”83 While the District Court nar-
rowly construed the meaning of “slum”
within the Act as “existence of conditions
‘injurious to the public health, safety,
morals, and welfare,’”84 the Supreme
Court allowed a broader reading of the
Act.  The Supreme Court extended the
Redevelopment Agency’s authority to
include “the blighted areas that tend to
produce slums.”85 Prevention of “future
blight” seems to fall within the Supreme
Court’s definition of the Agency’s power of
eminent domain.
Still, in California, the legislature has
narrowed the extent that economic revi-
talization can be considered a public use
and requires that blight be explicitly
linked to economic dislocation.86 The
California Supreme Court had already set
this high standard in 1976 when it held
that only proof of no economically viable
use could support a finding of economic
dislocation.87 The city could not treat the
site as a liability because of its unrealized
potential.88 In California, “future blight” is
not a justified means of satisfying the
“Public Use” provision.
D.  99 Cents Only: A Judicial Check on
the Redevelopment’s Power of
Eminent Domain
On this legal background, the District
Court of the Central District Court of
California approached the public use
question in 99 Cents Only Store v. Lancaster
Redevelopment Agency.89 The district court
found that the city and the
Redevelopment Agency had violated the
“public use” provision of the takings
clause, when the Agency initiated con-
demnation proceedings against 99 Cents
with the intent to transfer the property
directly to Costco.90 The court granted 99
Cents’ motion for summary judgment and
issued an injunction.91 In 2003, the appel-
late court reviewed the mootness issue
and determined that there was a live con-
troversy at the time the district court
granted this injunction.92
1.  Factual Background
In 1983, the city of Lancaster began a
revitalization plan of the area now in
question.  Under California’s Community
Redevelopment Law, the city had to
establish the parameters of the redevel-
opment area and a redevelopment plan.
The city established the Amargosa
Redevelopment Project Area93 and adopt-
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82.  Berman, 348 U.S. at 29.
83.  Id.
84.  117 F. Supp. 705, 724-25 (D.C. D.C. 1953).
85.  Berman, 348 U.S. at 35.
86.  Findings of blight are to be supported by at
least one physical as well as one economic blight-
ing condition listed in the statute.  Cal. Health &
Safety Code § 33031(a)(1963)(amended 1993).
87.  Sweetwater Valley Civic Assn v. City of National
City, 555 P.2d 1099, 1104 (Cal. 1976).  The court ruled
against a redevelopment project that would have replaced
a golf course that was susceptible to flooding with a high
revenue-producing shopping mall.  Although the golf
course was marginally profitable, the site would have been
more profitable with an intense commercial use.
88.  Id. at 1103-04.
89.  237 F. Supp.2d 1123 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
90.  Id. at 1130.
91.  Id.
92.  2003 WL 932421 *1.
93.  The Amargosa Area consists of approxi-
mately 4,600 acres.
findings that the Amargosa Area was
blighted.94 The city’s specific findings list-
ed “inadequate public improvement and
facilities, faulty subdivision planning, and
flood hazards” as the blight that plagued
the Amargosa Area.95 To redevelop this
area, the Plan gave the city the power of
eminent domain for twelve years, until
1995, in order to condemn blighted prop-
erty.  As part of the revitalization process,
Lancaster started a regional shopping
center development, called the Valley
Center shopping center.  The plan was to
have businesses in the “Power Center”
anchor the development.  In 1988, Costco
Wholesale Corporation agreed to be one
such “anchor” business and participated
in the development of the shopping cen-
ter until its completion in 1991 and the
completion of infrastructure in 1993.
To fund other planning projects, in
1994, the Agency amended the Plan to
allow it to continue using property tax
increment funds.96 At that time, the
Agency did not extend its eminent
domain powers, and these powers expired
in 1995, under the original Plan.  A second
amendment to the Plan in March of 1997
re-granted the power of eminent domain
to the Agency.  This revised Plan97 cited
no new findings of blight and instead
relied upon the 1983 findings.
In 1998, 99 Cents Only Store, “99
Cents,” moved into the Power Center in a
vacancy next to Costco.  At the time, 99
Cents signed a five-year lease with an
option to extend the lease for another fif-
teen years.  99 Cents was a successful
addition to the shopping center, which
had become quite prestigious.  Soon after
99 Cents opened in Lancaster, Costco felt
a need to expand, specifically onto the
site occupied by 99 Cents.  The property
owner, Burnham Pacific, explained that
“the most efficient use of [Costco’s] prop-
erty would be an expansion to the south
of their existing facility behind the 99
Cents Only Store.”98 Although this solu-
tion seemed like an adequate compro-
mise, the city and the Agency considered
Costco’s demands because they feared
Costco would leave and the city would
lose the tax revenue.99 Through negotia-
tions, the Agency, Costco and Burnham
Pacific drafted a Disposition and
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94.  The Plan which was adopted by ordinance
contained findings that:
“(i) inclusion within the Project Area of any lands,
buildings or improvements which are not detrimental to
the public health, safety or welfare is necessary for the
effective redevelopment of the area of which they are a
part; any such area included is necessary for effective
redevelopment of the Project Area and is not included for
the purpose of obtaining the allocation of tax increment
revenues from such area pursuant to Section 3367- of the
Community Redevelopment Law without substantial
justification for its inclusion.”
“(j) the elimination of blight and redevelopment of
the Project Area cannot reasonably expected to be
accomplished by private enterprise acting alone and
without the aid and assistance of the agency.”
95.  See 99 Cents Only, 237 F. Supp.2d at 1123.
96.  The Plan was amended to comply with AB 1290.
97.  The amendments did not add new area to the Plan.
98.  See 99 Cents Only, 237 F. Supp.2d at 1124..
99.  The fear of Costco’s departure was very real.  In
the mid-1980’s, the cities of Lancaster and Palmdale, the
only incorporated cities in the Antelope Valley, compet-
ed for many stores and shopping center developments.
A number of major tenants have moved from Lancaster
to Palmdale, leaving behind large vacant buildings and
suffering shopping centers.  In 1990, both Sears and J.C.
Penney moved to Palmdale with Palmdale’s assistance.
In 1998, Mervyns relocated to Palmdale.  (The empty
story was offered to 99 Cents as an option for a relocation
site.)  Between 1986 and 1994, four major car dealerships
relocated to Palmdale from Lancaster.  They city was very
concerned that Costco might also relocated to Palmdale
and leave behind a huge vacant building and the Power
Center on the road to deterioration.
the Agency would purchase the property
and have 99 Cents re-locate.  This deci-
sion, made without 99 Cents’ input, ended
with an agreement that the Agency would
acquire the property through eminent
domain for $3.8 million and then sell the
property to Costco for one dollar ($1).100
2.  Procedural History
In May 2000, the Agency commenced
the condemnation process of Burnham
Pacific’s property and offered to buy out
99 Cents’ leasehold interest for $130,000
and to pay relocation costs pursuant to
the terms of the Development Agreement,
which required the Agency to use its best
efforts to acquire the property.  99 Cents
rejected this offer.  The city held a public
hearing at which the Agency proposed
certain Resolutions (21-00 and 22-00) that
allowed the Agency to acquire the proper-
ty through eminent domain.  In these
Resolutions, the Agency made no findings
of blight concerning the Power Center and
99 Cents.101 The Resolutions were passed
June 27, 2000, and 99 Cents commenced
this lawsuit.
The Agency rescinded these
Resolutions six months later and termi-
nated the Development Agreement.102
The Agency argued to the district court
that these rescissions rendered 99 Cents’
complaint moot.  However, the Agency
would not agree to avoid using its emi-
nent domain power to acquire 99 Cents’
property interest if the Court were to dis-
miss the lawsuit.  99 Cents believes the
Agency may later use its power unless the
court rules.  Prior to the hearing, in March
2001, the Agency had found another site
not in the Power Center, which it was in
the process of transferring to Costco.
3.  Analysis of the District
Court’s Decision
The district court found that the
Agency’s attempt to use eminent domain
power to obtain 99 Cents’ property for
Costco violated the public use provision
of the Constitution.103 The Agency’s
actions failed both the test of blight
removal from Berman and Midkiff’s “purely
private use” test.104
In applying the Midkiff standard that
only the purpose of the taking must satis-
fy the “Public Use” provision,105 the court
found that the only reason the Agency
“took” the property was “to satisfy the pri-
vate expansion demands of Costco.”106
Such a purely private taking cannot “with-
stand the scrutiny of the public use
requirement” and does not serve a legiti-
mate governmental purpose.107 For a tak-
ing to meet this Public Use provision, it
need only be “rationally related to a con-
ceivable public purpose.”108 This stan-
dard is extremely low because the court













100.  99 Cents Only, 237 F. Supp.2d at 1124.
101.  Id.
102.  After adoption of the Resolutions, the Agency
learned that Home Base would not consent to construc-
tion of a Costco gas station in Costco’s existing parking
lot.  The Agency was required to rescind the DDA because
the DDA specifically required its termination, if the prop-
erty could not be acquired for any reason.
103.  99 Cents Only, 237 F. Supp.2d at 1130.
104.  The court also made decisions based upon
mootness and timeliness.  The city and Redevelopment
Agency also argue that this case should be heard in state
court.  This paper does not discuss any of these issues.
105.  Midkiff, 467 U.S.  at 242.
106.  99 Cents Only, 237 F. Supp.2d at 1128.
107.  Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 245.
108.  Id. at 241.
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the proffered public use, which needs not
to be proven, only be conceivable.
However, even under this deferential stan-
dard, mere existence of legislative action
does not establish public use as a matter
of law.109 Courts do play a role in review-
ing a legislature’s determination of the
public use.110 If the public use is demon-
strably pretextual, there is no requirement
for judicial deference.111
Here, the Agency’s use of eminent
domain was an attempt to transfer private
property from one private entity to anoth-
er.  The court held that appeasement of
Costco was not sufficiently related to a
public purpose to satisfy the Public Use
provision.112 Ironically, appeasement of
Costco seems to have been successfully
achieved without condemnation of 99
Cents’ property because Costco has
remained in Lancaster.113
Still, the Agency argued that satisfy-
ing Costco fulfilled the Public Use provi-
sion under Berman’s blight test.  As an
“anchor” business, Costco was necessary
to keep the Power Center from returning
to blight.  Under this future blight argu-
ment, there is no indication that 99 Cents
had elements of existing blight or was
contributing to the blight of the area.  The
Agency relied on the evidentiary findings
of blight in the original 1983 Amargosa
Plan to show that the Power Center would
exhibit blighted conditions if Costco left.
The court held that failure to show exist-
ing blight means that the Agency lacked a
valid public use within the meaning of the
Takings Clause.114 Future blight is not
designated as a way to meet the Public
Use provision of the California
Community Redevelopment Law.115
However, as explained above, a broad
reading of Berman may indicate future
blight as an appropriate determination of
public use.116 Still, Lancaster did not dis-
cuss the possibility of future blight before
this litigation.  Because a discussion of
future blight is not found in the
Resolutions or in the Development
Agreement with Costco, this public pur-
pose seems pretextual.  The district court
found that, even if future blight were a
means of establishing public use, the
record did not reflect the claim of future
blight.117 The court held that the Agency’s
attempt to wield its eminent domain
power to prevent some unidentifiable
“future blight” that may never materialize
violated the Public Use provision of the













109.  99 Cents Only, 237 F. Supp.2d at 1128.
110.  Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 240.
111.  Armendariz, 75 F.3d at 1321.
112.  Id..
113.  Unfortunately, the newly proposed site
for Costco requires building on approximately 5
acres of Lancaster’s City Park and the cutting down
of more than 100 trees.
114.  99 Cents Only, 237 F. Supp.2d at 1128,  n. 2.
115.  Absence of “future blight” as an allowable pub-
lic use determination in CRL is practical.  If redevelop-
ment agencies were allowed to use their eminent
domain powers to remove future blight, there would be
no check on their indiscriminate power.  No redevelop-
ment site would ever truly be free from blight because
future would always loom ever-present on the horizon.
See 99 Cents Only, 237 F. Supp.2d at 1129.
116.  In Berman, the United States Supreme Court
upheld as constitutional D.C.’s Redevelopment Act,
which granted eminent domain power to acquire real
property for the “redevelopment of blighted territory . . .
and the prevention, reduction, or elimination of blighting
factors or causes of blight.”  Berman, 348 U.S. at 29.
117.  99 Cents Only, 237 F. Supp.2d at 1129.
118.  Id. at 1130.
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III.  The Meaning of the “Public Use”
Provision Is the Future of the
Takings Clause
In the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment, the inherent sovereign
power of eminent domain is limited by
the requirement of payment of just com-
pensation and public use.  The just com-
pensation requirement naturally limits
the government’s power and protects pri-
vate property because the government
can only afford to pay for a certain amount
of property that it acquires through emi-
nent domain.  The Public Use provision
requires that the legislature make deter-
minative findings as to public use.
Courts review legislative findings
with substantial deference.119 Under the
Takings Clause, the court defers to the leg-
islative determination of “public use”
unless “it is shown to involve an impossi-
bility.”120 Such judicial restraint allows
state and local governments to make
broad decisions affecting their jurisdic-
tions without having these decisions sec-
ond-guessed by a judge who is unaware of
the particular issues affecting the specific
communities.  The legislature has the role
of protecting the public good and, thus,
should make these decisions.121 Eminent
domain is one of the tools available to the
legislature to protect the public good.
The court is a buffer, or as James Madison
referred to it, a “defensive authority,”
between the rights of the people and the
legislature.122 The duty of the courts is to
hold the legislature within its enumerated
authority.  Once a legislature has deter-
mined that the public good is compro-
mised, the court presumes that the plan,
created to restore the public welfare, is
rationally related to a public use.  If the
legislature exceeds its authority and false-
ly determines public use, no such judicial
deference is required.123
The purpose of the Fifth Amendment
is to protect the property interest of pri-
vate individuals.  The framers of the
Constitution believed popular govern-
ment could pose a threat to property
rights, but they also believed that a strong
national government could protect prop-
erty rights.  Alexander Hamilton declared:
“One great obj[ective] Of Gov[ernment] is
personal protection and the security of
Property.”124 For many of the framers,
property was intrinsically related to liber-
ty: “Property must be secured or liberty
cannot exist.”125 While the Constitution
does not proclaim the natural right of
property ownership, Virginia and North
Carolina did request an amendment
which declared that acquisition, posses-
sion and protection of property to be list-
ed as an inalienable right.126 James
Madison drafted the Fifth Amendment
takings clause as an additional safeguard
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In drafting the Fifth Amendment, Madison
relied on language from the Northwest
Ordinance and the Massachusetts and
Vermont state constitutions to convey the
financial burden of public works from the
individual to the public.128 The Northwest
Ordinance states that 
No man shall be deprived of his
liberty or property, but by the
judgment of his peers, or the law
of the land, and should the public
exigencies make it necessary, for
the common preservation, to take
any person’s property, or to
demand his particular services,
full compensation shall be made
for the same.129
The Fifth Amendment also transfers
the burden of public works from the indi-
vidual to the public by requiring just com-
pensation.
After the states ratified the Bill of
Rights, Madison wrote an essay suggest-
ing a broad interpretation of the Fifth
Amendment.130 He declared that a gov-
ernment “which indirectly violates their
property, in their actual possessions . . . is
not a pattern for the US.”131 It seems
Madison sought a generous understand-
ing of the takings clause to include more
than just physical takings of property.  The
Supreme Court followed this interpreta-
tion when defining modern property
rights, after Justice Holmes held that a
regulation that goes too far is a taking.132
Takings today represent the balance
between government action to protect the
public good and the property rights of a
private individual.  When the government,
whether it is federal, state, local or a rede-
velopment agency, acquires private property
through eminent domain, the landowner is
fairly compensated.  The individual is not
forced to bear the burden of the public good,
which seems to be the rationale behind
Madison’s Fifth Amendment Takings Clause.
On the other hand, the government is limit-
ed in its ability to wield its eminent domain
power by the requirement of compensation
at fair market value.  Therefore, this power is
used sparingly.  This balance and the limit
on the abuse of the power come from the
just compensation requirement.
The meaning and purpose of the just
compensation requirement is clear, but the
importance of the Public Use provision is
still questioned.  In the Constitution, the
words “public use” are not defined and the
structure does not imply that a taking must
be for a “public use.”133 “The phrase does
not read ‘shall not be taken except for pub-
lic use and not without just compensa-
tion.’”134 Court decisions tend to rely on the
just compensation requirement as the
major limitation to the Takings Clause.
Such readings of the Fifth Amendment
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STATES CONSTITUTION (1982).
130.  THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON vol. 14., 266-
68 (Robert A. Rutlands & Thomas A. Mason
eds.)(Univ. Press of Vir. 1983).
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07 (Charles F. Hobson & Robert A. Rutlands, eds.)
(Univ. Press of Vir., 1979).
132.  Pennsylvania Coal, Co. v. Mahon, 260
U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
133.  William Stoebuck, A General Theory of
Eminent Domain, 47 WASH. L. REV. 553, 591 (1972).
134.  Id.
135.  See Comment, Rolling the Dice: Determining
A.  The Public Use Provision is
Necessary to Specify the Extent of
the Government’s Power of 
Eminent Domain
Although the “public use” provision
has become toothless in the text of the
modern doctrine, the language “for public
use” has an important place in the text of
the Takings Clause.  For strict textualists,
these three words, located between
“taken” and “without just compensation,”
mean that when the government takes pri-
vately owned property it must be put to a
public use.136 This construction of “for
public use” no longer duplicates the
“legitimate state-interest” test that is
required by the Due Process Equal
Protection Clauses.  If Madison intended
the Takings Clause to be an “additional
safeguard” on the due process protection
of property,137 then the Public Use provi-
sion must be a higher standard than the
due process test.  The Public Use provi-
sion’s purpose is to relieve the individual
landowner of the cost of projects that con-
demn property for state use to benefit the
public and should therefore be borne by
the community as a whole.
Such a strict reading of the Takings
Clause would reduce redistribution of prop-
erty138 and calls into question redevelop-
ment law.  Specifically, reading a height-
ened standard into the Takings Clause
through the Public Use provision would
nullify Midkiff.  If the phrase “for public use”
merely reflects the requirement of a ration-
al relationship between the state interest
and the taking, then no state use is required
and the three words are meaningless.  Basic
statutory construction emphasizes a literal
meaning of the text.  Why would Madison
have included the public use provision, if
the Takings Clause requires only basic due
process guarantees?
There are two limitations on the gov-
ernment’s sovereign power of eminent
domain: just compensation and public
use.  The government must meet both of
these requirements in order to lawfully
condemn property.  Reading the Takings
Clause as to only require payment of fair
market value and a rational legitimate
governmental interest renders the Public
Use provision useless.  Without this provi-
sion, the possibilities of abuse increase.
The lower standard of a legitimate govern-
mental interest currently allows for rede-
velopment agencies to take property from
one private party and give it directly to
another private party if the transfer seems
to be in the public interest or for the pub-
lic good.139
Meddling in the free market is bound
to cause problems and incite corruptive
uses of the eminent domain power.
Competitive markets promote economic
efficiency.140 However, the continual
temptation for governments to intervene
upsets the balance, efficiency, and suc-
cess of these markets.141 One example of
a government regulation which seems to
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138.  Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 245.
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141.  Id.
severely burdens the public, is rent con-
trol.  Specifically, in New York, a city of
renters,142 the City Rent Guidelines Board
sets rates well below the market levels
and also sets limits on vacancy
allowances.143 With this system, land-
lords lose $200 million more than renters
gain.144 This deadweight loss of $200 mil-
lion per year is a loss in efficiency and
negatively affects the public as a whole.
Similarly, when governments use
eminent domain to favor one private
interest over another, economic efficiency
is lost.  The Public Use provision guards
against governmental encroachment into
the private sector.  Therefore, the Public
Use provision should be treated as a sep-
arate and distinct requirement in the
Takings Clause.  While a certain amount of
redevelopment is acceptable, when it
goes to far, to the point of the government
meddling in the interests of private par-
ties, a taking has occurred.  The district
court in 99 Cents Only was correct in rec-
ognizing a condemnation that lacked the
requisite findings under the Public Use
provision.145 Although the Supreme
Court has held that removal of blight suf-
ficiently fulfills the Public Use provision,
“future blight” is not equivalent to public
use.  When the government hypothesizes
about the impact one existing private
entity may have on a community, the use
of eminent domain to insure the private
entity’s success goes too far and is an
unconstitutional taking.
However, Madison did intend a broad
reading of the “public interest” provision
of the Takings Clause.146 In fact, the
Berman Court states that eminent domain
can be granted to redevelopment agen-
cies to eliminate or prevent blighting fac-
tors or causes of blight.147 Perhaps a
broader, non-literal interpretation of the
“public use” provision is correct.
B.  Judicial Restraint Bars Courts 
from Involving Themselves in the
Politics of Takings
Courts are directed to defer to the leg-
islative judgment because the legislature is
the body of government charged with pro-
tecting the public welfare.148 The legisla-
ture has the resources to make evidentiary
findings and to pass laws with the goal of
providing for the people.  A court that is
removed from the public arena may not be
aware of the needs of a specified communi-
ty.  In the past, when a judicially active
Court involved itself in social controversy,
the Court opened the door to years of criti-
cism and non-sensical decisions.149 In
Lochner v. New York, the United States
Supreme Court overturned a New York law
that limited the hours of labor for bakery
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142.  Whereas 60 percent of American families
own their own homes, only 30 percent of New
Yorkers are owners.  Id. at 283.
143.  Id.
144.  There are about 1.8 million apartments
in New York.  The average rent in $7,000 per year,
whereas the equilibrium rent would be about
$8,000.  Landlord loss is $1.8 million * ($8,000 -
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145.  99 Cents Only, 237 F. Supp.2d at 1130.
146.  Id. at 1129.
147.  See Berman, 348 U.S. at 29.
148.  Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 239.
149.  Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
law did not serve an adequate purpose.150
For three decades, the Court maintained its
role of actively determining the limit of the
state’s police power.151 By the mid-1930’s,
legal realists recognized the Lochner opinion
as a decision, which merely overturned the
political process.  There is no reason for the
Court to participate in political choices.152
Therefore, the court should leave the
issues of development to the politics of the
legislature.  The legislators, elected individu-
als, are publicly accountable to their con-
stituents.  The lobbying and public hearings
are designed to provide the lawmakers with
information about the needs and desires of
the public.  The court lacks this information.
When the Redevelopment Agency of
Lancaster agreed to condemn the property
where 99 Cents was located, and pay their
relocation costs, this decision reflected what
the city council and the Redevelopment
Agency thought was best for the public
good.  It is also evident that 99 Cents did not
sufficiently persuade the local government
of the benefit it could provide the city.  And
the public had an opportunity to voice their
worries at the public hearings.  Judicial
restraint reasons that because the court was
not present at these hearings it should stay
away from this level of local politics.
1.  Court Supports Dairy Industry Over
Oleo-Margarine Producers
The courts have previously refused to
get involved when the legislature has
passed laws, which would benefit one pri-
vate entity over another.  In the early
1870’s, the dairy industry began lobbying
state legislatures for protection through
anti-margarine laws.  The first result was
state labeling statutes in 1877.153
Because these statutes were not 100-per-
cent effective at protecting the butter
industry, the lobbying continued.  Relying
on weak public interest claims - margarine
was alleged to be unhealthy, to cause dys-
pepsia and a number of other aliments -
the dairy industry won over many legisla-
tures.  Even a House of Representatives
committee, which studied margarine,
determined that the imitation product was
detrimental to public health.154 The
Supreme Court upheld anti-margarine
statutes, which regulated or prohibited the
sale or use of margarine, because the state
had the power to protect public health.155
Essentially, the government was legally
boosting the dairy industry by regulating
margarine production.  In 1886, to increase
Congressional support, the dairy industry
organized a massive letter-writing cam-
paign, which was impressive even by today’s
standards.156 Both Houses of Congress
passed the federal anti-margarine bill; and
under further political pressure, President
Cleveland signed the Margarine Tax Act into
law.157 The survival of democracy rests on
the fact that people elect legislators to rep-
resent their interests.  If the courts are con-
tinually bypassing the voice of the people,
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2.  Welfare of the Public’s Eyes Rests in
the Hands of the Legislature
A more recent example of the govern-
ment successfully defending one private
interest over another is Williamson v. Lee
Optical of Oklahoma.  The Oklahoma state
law at issue specifically stated that only a
licensed optometrist or ophthalmologist
or someone with prescriptive authority
from an optometrist or ophthalmologist
may fit lens to the face or replace the
lens.158 Petitioners claimed the statute
was unconstitutional because it violated
the Due Process Clause “by arbitrarily
interfering with the optician’s right to do
business.”159 Even though the trial court
agreed with the petitioner, the US
Supreme Court determined that it was the
legislature’s role, not that of the courts “to
balance the advantages and disadvan-
tages” of the new law.160 The Court relied
upon Judge Waite’s wise statement: “For
protection against abuses by legislators
the people must resort to the polls, not to
the courts.”161 As long as the law is
“rationally related to the public health
and welfare,” the legislature may regulate
private enterprise.162 The legislature has
an interest in attempting to free eye-pro-
fessionals “from all taints of commercial-
ism.”163 Even though the legislature
chose to only regulate some of the people
who work with human eyes, the law pro-
scribing solicitations and advertisements
was constitutional because the legislature
may choose the evils it can effectively
combat.164
C.  The Impact 99 Cents Only Will Have
on Takings Law
This case is still in its infancy and,
therefore, any forecasts as to the ultimate
impact on the Takings Clause and
Redevelopment Law are purely speculative.
Cities and redevelopment agencies
bemoaned the district court’s opinion,
declaring that the decision will severely
hamper the ability of the city’s redevelop-
ment agency to undertake future proj-
ects.165 Furthermore, involvement of the
courts in municipal decisions undermines
the role of the legislative bodies to deter-
mine how individual projects are carried
out within the bounds of legitimate com-
munity redevelopment.166 Redevelop-
ment agencies are predicting an alarming
trend in decisions limiting the govern-
ment’s taking and redevelopment power.167
On the other hand, this decision may
mark the end of the abuses of redevelop-
ment.  Newspapers reporting on this issue
stated that property owners can now
breathe a collective sigh of relief.168 This
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homeowner whose house is being sought by
the city’s redevelopment agency for a
Starbucks coffee shop parking lot.169 Courts
that actively check legislative decisions will
reduce corruption and collusion between
cities and private entities.  By actually
enforcing the Public Use provision, courts
will no longer rubber stamp whatever rede-
velopment agencies do.170 One such court,
another United States district court in the
Central District of California, relied on the
Public Use provision to prevent the transfer
of private land for redevelopment purpos-
es.171 In this case, the city wanted to give the
private land of a church to Costco in order to
further retail development.172 The court
likened the situation to that in 99 Cents Only
and described both scenarios as “the naked
transfer of property from one private party to
another.”173 The similarities between the
cases are eerie, but the potential power of
the Public Use provision is evident.
Perhaps, the result will be a greater
emphasis on property rights, more similar
to the intent of Madison and the
framers.174 However, the courts must also
recognize the modern complexities of
society as important.  Madison probably
did not envision redevelopment projects
and their impact on the modern under-
standing of the Taking Clause.
Eminent domain should be limited
to the creation of either pure public goods
or quasi-public goods subject to common
carrier provisions.175 One problem with cur-
rent analysis of the takings clause and the
public use provision is the lack of any fac-
tors for the courts to apply to redevelop-
ment situations.  One possible approach
would be a balancing test where the court
would weigh the following factors: “(1) the
amount of deference courts are to give to
the municipality’s proposed legislative
action; (2) the economic costs of the tak-
ings; (3) the economic benefits of the pro-
posed development; and finally, (4) the pri-
vate market alternatives that are available to
acquire the necessary realty.”176 This test
may be effective, but like so many other bal-
ancing tests, the lack of a clear test may lead
to inconsistent application.
The largest downfall in takings cases
is the lack of a clear definition of the pub-
lic use provision.  Under Berman, the court
must focus on the redevelopment agency’s
findings of blight.177 This requirement was
relaxed in Midkiff, where only purely private
takings run awry of the public use provi-
sion.178 In order to reconcile the many fed-
eral district and appellate court decisions,
the United States Supreme Court needs to
develop a comprehensive test to deter-
mine what is a public use.  Whether this
test would hamper redevelopment or pro-
tect property owners, it would give guid-
ance to the courts and to the legislative
bodies as to what conduct lies within the
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Spring 2003 Taking for Any Purpose?
Takings Resource Guide
1. Timothy Sandefur, A Natural Rights Perspective on Eminent Domain in California:  A
Rationale for Meaningful Judicial Scrutiny of "Public Use,"  32 Sw. U. L. Rev. 569, 676
(2003).
Examines the theoretical history of the state constitution's public use clause and its
current vitality as a limitation on the government's power to take property without
an owner's consent.
2. David L. Callies, Compulsory Purchase in Hawaii:  What's a Public Purpose?,  6-JUN
Haw. B.J. 6, 33 (2002). 
States the rule in Hawaii with respect to public purpose is the federal rule:  absent
an inconceivable public purpose, or one without foundation or impossible, our
courts defer to the judgment of the state legislature and the county councils. 
3. Robert G. Klein, Twenty First Century Condemnation:  Say Aloha to "Public Purpose,"
6-JUN Haw. B.J. 7, 36 (2002).
Argues that at least for the last half century, the ascendant proposition has been that
both State legislatures and their county analogues can effectuate takings of private
property for purposes co-extensive with their "police powers."
4. Jeffery W. Scott, Public Use and Private Profit:  When Should Heightened Scrutiny be
Applied to "Public-Private" Takings?, 12-SUM J. Affordable Housing & Community
Dev. L. 466 (2003).
Suggests a means to curb the abuses of public-private takings without destroying
their utility for legitimate public projects.
5. Takings and Wetlands
http://www.epa.gov/owow/wetlands/facts/fact18.html
The EPA answers the question: When does a government action affecting private
property amount to a "taking," and what are the takings implications of wetland reg-
ulation? 
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